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The business of the United States Supreme Court in 1824 reflects
a rich and not altogether familiar legal world. But the student pursu-
ing a curiosity about the Court of 150 years ago starts from firmer
ground than most historians, since there is one source which is con-
temporary, comprehensive, and learned: the ninth volume of Henry
Wheaton's annual Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the
Supreme Court of the United States, subtitled February Term, 1824.1
The Supreme Court in 1824 was perhaps as powerful an institution
as it is today, but in the public eye it was far from being as grand,
as impartial, or as ultimate. The salary was poor,2 and circuit duty
was so arduous that-with the exception of the Chief Justice and Justice
Story3-the Justices spent relatively little of their time and effort de-
ciding cases at the highest level. During their sitting in Washington,
the Justices enjoyed few trappings of office; their courtroom was in
the basement of the Senate Chamber,4 and the seven men-none of
whom ever brought his wife to the capital-all lived together in a
boardinghouse. 5 Washington's more permanent residents were far more
comfortable, and the President maintained a "regal" mansion.0 The
Justices were compensated in part by their status as social lions. Their
short term in the capital, less than two months, was the high point
of the Washington social season, and those who chose to, particularly
the young and energetic Justice Story, made the most of it, dining
t Member, California Bar.
f Member, Massachusetts Bar.
1. Wheaton was the Court's first official reporter, appointed under the Act of Mar. 3,
1816, 3 Stat. 876. He was also the first to undertake serious commentary and analysis of
the decisions he reported. See, e.g., the introduction and annotations to his first volume,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) (1816).
2. In 1824 the Chief Justice earned $5,000, the Associates $4,500. During the decade
before 1819, Congress had refused the Justices a badly needed raise because of dis-
pleasure over controversial decisions. See G. DUNNE, JUSTIcE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 178 (1970).
3. In his 34 years on the Supreme Court, Marshall wrote almost half of the 1100
opinions delivered. Pollak, Introduction to 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS at x (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) [herein-
after cited as LivEs OF THE JUsTIcES]. Story's erudition and output were legendary, and at
least once they provoked a fellow Justice to record his annoyance in an opinion. See G.
DUNNE, supra note 2, at 169.
4. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 460-63 (1926).
5. Id. at 473. This arrangement made possible the service of Justice Gabriel Duvall,
who was quite deaf and could hear nothing at oral argument. Id. at 797. Fellow Justices
explained the cases to him in the privacy of their boardinghouse.
6. G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 125.
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frequently at the White House and appearing there, at least for formal
affairs, dressed in judicial robes. 7
Washington, however, was not the center of the world, nor was a
seat on the Supreme Court necessarily the pinnacle of a lawyer's career.
Justice Smith Thompson wavered for months before agreeing to ac-
cept his seat, and five years later he saw no barrier to running for
the governorship of the state of New York while continuing to sit as
a Justice.s Justice William Johnson, appointed at age 32 by Jefferson,
spent several subsequent years trying to arrange a post for himself as
tax collector of Charleston,9 which would have yielded twice the
salary. Story himself, appointed only after three other nominees had
turned down the job, more than once considered leaving for private
practice, and during his tenure he pursued numerous outside interests.
Among other activities which apparently provoked no suspicion of
conflict of interest, he exercised an influence in Massachusetts politics,
marketed official reports of the decisions in his circuit, and served
as president of a bank. 10
The Supreme Court bar in 1824 was a small group of lawyers who
knew each other and the Justices intimately; they were likely to see
the latter as frequently at dinner as in ,court.11 Henry Clay, for ex-
ample, had trained in the Richmond law office of Justice Bushrod
Washington, and the story was told that one day while arguing before
the Court, he reached out and helped himself to a pinch of snuff from
Justice Washington's snuff box. 12 There were antipathies too, and in
one famous incident Justice Johnson delivered a long tirade in open
court, ridiculing the argument of the leading member of the bar; the
latter had to be forcibly restrained. 13 The man in the most deli-
cate position was Henry Wheaton, simultaneously the Court's reporter,
a leading advocate, a conspicuous social figure, and himself a disap-
pointed candidate for a seat on the Court.' 4 Wheaton was particularly
7. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 471-73.
8. See Dunne, Smith Thompson, in LivEs oF THE JUsTIcEs, supra note 3, at 478; G.
DONNE, supra note 2, at 281.
9. G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 170.
10. Id. at 77-80, 91, 106, 120, 129.
11. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 471-73.
12. Morgan, William Johnson, in LivEs OF THE JUSTICES, supra note 3, at 247.
13. G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 200. Johnson was described as irascible by contempor-
aries, and he nursed a particularly sharp feud with Justice Story throughout their joint
tenure on the bench. Id. at 168-70, 198-202. In 1824 Johnson had snide comments for
Henry Wheaton. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 718.
14. See E. BAKER, HENRY NVHEATON 36, 62 (1937). Wheaton was also an active politician
in New York and tried to play kingmaker both in New York and national politics. Id. at
47-50, 62. He "made no secret of the duality of his callings" advertising his reporter status
in announcements of his availability as a counselor before the Supreme Court. G. DUNNE,
supra note 2, at 199.
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close to Justice Story, whom he frequently solicited for glosses, head-
note material, and legal business, and the official reports bear some
of Story's touches. 15
The dominant political issue in 1824 was the balance of power
between federal and state governments, the importance of which had
been re-emphasized in the battles over the Missouri Compromise in
1820. That 1824 was a presidential election year did nothing to lessen
popular interest.'0 On the central issue, the Supreme Court found
itself firmly identified with the Federalists'17-even though five of its
seven members had been appointed by Republican presidents' 8-and
consequently under bitter attack, both in individual state legislatures"0
and in Congress. The primary target was the Court's power to review
decisions of state courts under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
in 1824 the House of Representatives was actively considering the
repeal of § 25.20 There were also proposals that state laws could be
declared unconstitutional only by a five-vote majority, and that the
Justices be forced to deliver opinions seriatim. 21
15. G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 199-200, 323-24. Dunne describes Story as a de factojoint venturer with Wheaton in the latter's reports.
16. In November, John Quincy Adams defeated Andrew Jackson for the presidency
even though Jackson won the popular vote. Major participants in the politics of nomina-
tion included Henry Clay, Smith Thompson, and Henry Wheaton.
17. From 1816 to 1823, the Court handed down a famous and controversial stream of
decisions, all expanding federal power at the expense of the states: Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 304 (1816); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crown-
inshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821);
and Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). Two more great cases were added to the
series in 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1; and Osborn v. The Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738. See generally C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITIes 1789-1835, at 337-497 (1944).
18. Only John Marshall and Bushrod Washington had been appointed before Thomas
Jefferson became President in 1801, yet the Court was a remarkably cohesive-and Federa-
list-unit under the leadership of the Chief Justice. Except for Smith Thompson, who took
his seat in 1824, the members of the Court had been together since 1812, and perhaps they
had taken the opportunity to achieve a smooth working relationship. The only maverick,
and the only real source of Republican views, was William Johnson, and his political posi-
tion was less consistent than his party would have liked.
Apart from Johnson and the unknown Thompson, the Associate Justices in 1824 ap-
peared to antagonists to be thoroughly under the Chief Justice's influence. Washington,
the only other Federalist, was almost superhumanly loyal to Marshall, disagreeing with
him on a vote only three times in 29 years. Thomas Todd and Gabriel Duvall, dismissed
by their biographers as respectively "one of the least known" and "probably the most
insignificant" of all the Supreme Court Justices who ever sat, showed little independence
or assertiveness. And Joseph Story, though thoroughly independent and vigorous, had
wholly abandoned his original and tentative Republican allegiance. See generally LIvES OF
THE JUSTICES, supra note 3.
19. See generally C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 463-97.
20. Id. at 501-02.
21. Id. at 485-87, 512. The point of the seriatim proposal, which had the backing of
both Jefferson and Madison, was the suspicion that Marshall's powerful opinions masked
internal dissension on the Court which individual opinions would reveal. Id. at 375-77,
517 & n. 57. It was probably hoped that forcing each Justice to offer his own explanation
of a decision would diminish Marshall's influence within the Court and dilute his impact
on the public mind. Until Marshall became Chief Justice, seriatim opinions were the
normal practice, and they remained so in state courts. See id. at 517.
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Of the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1824 term, by far the best
known is Gibbons v. Ogden,22 a case which needs no explanation.
The subsequent history of Gibbons as a tool for federal economic
regulation is so familiar, however, that the actual case is rarely con-
sidered in the setting in which it was decided. A fresh look at the
other cases of its year may help to provide the necessary context.
Because the Court's jurisdiction was largely appellate, there was little
control of the docket, and the cases of the 1824 term present a broad
array.
I. Salt Water Commerce
Maritime cases formed a large and steady part of the Supreme Court's
work in the 1820's; in 1824, there were nine such cases. The Con-
stitution granted exclusive jurisdiction over "admiralty and maritime"
causes to the federal courts, 2 3 and from the beginning it was assumed
to be a major piece of judicial business. When the draftsmen of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 vested original jurisdiction over admiralty mat-
ters in the District Courts, 24 they considered it to be "the real meat" of
the jurisdictional allotment to those courts.25 On the path from District
to Circuit to Supreme Court, the only real obstacle was the jurisdic-
tional amount, and admiralty cases tended to involve well more than
the $2,000 required for the final step of appeal (by writ of error) to
the Supreme Court.26 Moreover, the scope of admiralty jurisdiction
had been very broadly interpreted to cover "all maritime contracts,
torts, and injuries. The latter branch [torts] is necessarily bounded
by locality; the former extends over all contracts ... which relate to
the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea." 27 That classic state-
ment, delivered in 1815 by Justice Story while he was sitting on cir-
cuit in Boston, was never formally adopted by the Supreme Court, but
all of the Justices in 1824 apparently agreed with its tenor.28 The
broad jurisdiction brought a wealth of new legal issues, since shipping
22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73. Admiralty practice permitted essentially
a trial de novo in the circuit court, in the court's discretion; and it contemplated the
taking of new evidence even by the Supreme Court. See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat.
244.
25. 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNImTD STATrs: ANTE CFD-
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 474 (1971).
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244.
27. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (1815).
28. See, e.g., The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 402 (1824). The jurisdiction was
restricted to tidal waters the following year in The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
428 (1825). One of the antifederal proposals of the Kentucky legislature in 1824 was just
such a limit on admiralty jurisdiction, see G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 215. See generally
p. 772 supra.
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was the core of American commerce in the early 19th century before
the great westward expansion began. And yet ordinary commercial
questions were the least of the problems in the admiralty cases before
the Court.
Volatile international issues underlay all but one of the Court's
1824 maritime cases, and the foremost issue was the slave trade. The
traffic in human beings, which had been almost universally tolerated
through the end of the 18th century,2 9 was being actively resisted in
1824 by the United States and Great Britain, and every major Euro-
pean country had made a formal declaration opposing it. American
legislation against the trade had begun in 1794 with a prohibition
against the participation of U.S. citizens in the trade from an American
base.30 Congress later prohibited participation of United States citizens
in the slave trade anywhere in the world,31 and prohibited importation
of slaves into the United States by citizens and ships of any nation-
ality.32 In 1820 Congress made the shipping of slaves an act of piracy,
and therefore punishable by death.33 As the official attitude hardened,
so did public opinion, and by 1824, although "the American flag had
vanished from the slave trade,"'3 4 President Monroe's government was
under pressure to force all other nations to stop as well. The major
offenders were Spain and Portugal, who continued to shelter most of
the trade under their flags.
The problem for nations opposing the slave trade was not how to
handle their own ships, but what to do with those of foreign sovereigns.
If every nation involved were willing and able to patrol its own
coasts and the west coast of Africa, the slavers could have been stopped
without international incident. Short of that impossibility, effective
enforcement required that one nation's cruisers be able to stop and
search the ships of others. Britain, the strongest naval power, had
cruisers patrolling the African coast which stopped most ships with
impunity, but the British could not interfere with American flag
vessels without risking reprisals from a naval power nearly its equal.
After the War of 1812, Americans were particularly touchy. As a re-
sult, slavers discouraged British interference by sailing under false
29. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 116 (1825); cf. 1 C. WARREN, supra
note 4, at 585.
30. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347.
31. Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70.
32. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450.
33. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4-5, 3 Stat. 600.
34. W. HOWARD, AMERICAN SLAVERS AND "THE FEDERAL LAw 30 (1963).
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American flags and papers.35 The obvious and effective solution would
have been a British-American treaty allowing reciprocal rights of
search, and as the Supreme Court sat in 1824 the prospects for such
a treaty looked promising. In 1823, the House of Representatives had
overwhelmingly approved a resolution urging Monroe to negotiate with
the maritime powers "for the effectual abolition of the African slave
trade," 30 and on March 13, 1824, British and American negotiators
agreed on the text of a comprehensive anti-slave-trade treaty including
reciprocal visit and search rights, which the British Parliament passed
within the month. Only after the Court's term ended did the Senate
decide not to ratify the treaty, putting. an end to any hope for a
quick abolition of the trade.3 7
In the meantime, as the negotiations progressed in 1824, there re-
mained the legal problem of captured foreign-flag slavers, who were
not trying to import slaves into the United States. Only if the slave
trade violated international law could an American court assert juris-
diction, and on that crucial question there was passionate debate. After
some indecision,38 the British High Court of Admiralty had apparent-
ly decided in 1817 that slavery did not violate international law.30
Justice Story on circuit had decided the opposite in 1822.40 The ques-
tion, though not directly addressed by the Court in 1824,41 was ob-
viously ripe, and it was on the minds of the Justices.
Though admiralty questions combined arcane learning with dip-
lomatic delicacy, the Supreme Court of 1824 was reasonably well
equipped to treat them. The resident authority (as in other fields)
was Justice Story, whose prior law practice in Massachusetts had been
largely composed of admiralty cases42 and who had edited and pro-
vided American annotations for a leading British treatise on the sub-
ject. 43 The Court also leaned on its bar for instruction in interna-
35. American papers and flags offered protection from British cruisers only as long as
they were believed. If they were suspected of being fraudulent, their holders could be
taken to an American court for violating the U.S. Ship Registry Act. American justice for
slavers was dreaded, and as a result it was common for a suspected slaver under British
investigation to throw its American papers overboard. Id. at 20.
36. 40 ANNALS OF CONG., 1147-55 (1823).
37. See generally S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICy 423-33 (1949); W. HOWARD, supra note 34, at 13-27.
38. The precedents are discussed in the arguments of counsel in The Antelope, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 66, 77-105 (1825).
39. Le Louis, I Dods. 260, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817).
40. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenic, 26 F. Cas. 832 (No. 15,551) (1822).
41. It was decisively settled, in favor of the British view, the following year in an
opinion by Marshall. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
42. G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 101.
43. C. ABBOrr, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN, WITH
THE CoPIous ANNOTATIONS OF JOSEPH STORY (1822) [hereinafter cited as ABBoTr's LAW OF
SHIPPING].
775
The Yale Law Journal
tional law matters. Daniel Webster, Attorney General William Wirt,
David B. Ogden, William H. Winder, and Henry Wheaton were par-
ticularly helpful.44
A. The Slave Trade
The Margaret45 was a classic slave trade case, and like most such, it
involved no actual slaves. Nor was there any proof that the ship which
had been seized and brought to court was likely to be used in the
forbidden trade; it bore none of the characteristic trappings of the
outfitted slaver. The Margaret, originally American-owned, had sailed
from its home port of Baltimore to Havana, where it had taken on
Spanish papers, a Spanish captain, and apparently a Spanish owner.
When it was stopped by a revenue cutter on the trip back to Balti-
more, its crew proffered its old American papers. The Spanish cap-
tain masqueraded as a passenger and hid the Spanish documents, but
he and they were discovered and the Margaret was seized.40
The Ship Registry Acts, which governed the official registering of
American vessels, provided that when a registered American ship was
sold to a foreign owner, its registration certificate had to be sur-
rendered to an American tax collector.47 The penalty for noncom-
pliance was forfeiture of the ship. 48 If the Margaret had been sold
to a Spaniard, as it appeared, its continuing possession of its American
certificate violated the statute. Haley, the ship's American owner,
offered an ingenious defense. He admitted the transfer of title to a
Spanish subject and the ship's "assumption of a Spanish character,"
but he argued "that it was a mere colourable transfer, for the purpose
of evading the Spanish revenue laws, the real American ownership
not having been bona fide changed." 49 Since ownership had not really
changed, the registry act ought not apply. The district court in Bal-
timore, and subsequently the circuit court, agreed. *
Justice Story easily refuted Haley's argument, both on the language
of the statute and on its underlying policy. He observed that Haley
could use his two sets of papers to evade American revenue laws as
44. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 567. As a reporter, Wheaton had a special in-
terest in admiralty, especially prize cases. E. BAKER, supra note 14, at 31. See generally
Appendix, Note II at 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 494-506 (1816), and the appendix notes in 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) appendix at 23-59 (1819), and 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) appendix at 52-158 (1820).
Until 1819 Wheaton had been Chief Judge of the Marine Court. E. BAKER, supra, at 24-25.
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 421 (1824).
46. Id. at 422-23.
47. Act of Dec. 31, 1792, ch. 1, § 7, 1 Stat. 287.
48. Id. § 16.
49. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 423.
50. Id. at 424.
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easily as he admittedly was evading Spanish laws. By construing the
statute broadly, Story derived "a strict and plain rule" that all title
transfers came under the registry provisions.51 But though his reason-
ing was wholly adequate for the case, Story was not satisfied. He went
on at surprising length about the scope and strictness of the con-
gressional intent, introduced a lecture on the breadth of admiralty
jurisdiction, 52 and in pure dictum issued a reminder that in these
cases owners who claimed innocence of such shady transfers bore the
burden of proof.53 The impression given to the reader-and to lower
courts-was that the United States should enforce its registry acts fero-
ciously and split no hairs.
Story was rarely succinct, but The Margaret was a remarkably simple
case, and prolixity alone does not explain the tone of the opinion.
The more likely explanation is the unmentioned but pervasive pres-
ence of the slave trade. Whatever the Margaret's purpose, every judge
of the time knew that hundreds of American-built ships passed into
the slave trade along the Margaret's route, being sold to Spanish and
Portuguese owners at Havana or Bahia . 4 The fast Baltimore clippers
were a favorite slave ship, and the Baltimore shipbuilders did a thriv-
ing business.P American registration papers were much in demand by
foreign slave ship owners, for the relative immunity from British sei-
zure they provided, and customhouse perjury to obtain those papers
was rife.5" What Story had in mind as he sought to put teeth in the
ship registry acts was not some petty cheating on shipping taxes, but
the profitable 1 and morally outrageous 5s trade in slaves.59
51. Id. at 425. Story's broad construction of the statute is in contrast with his much
less expansive reading of the Statute of William, 11 and 12 Win. 111, ch. 6 in M'Creery's
Lessee v. Somerville, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 354 (1824).
52. Id. at 426-29.
53. Id. at 425-26.
54. W. HOWARD, supra note 34, at 30.
55. Id.
56. "Perjury permitted many an American vessel to be converted into foreign property
while sailing under American registry, immune to British seizure." Id. at 20.
57. See id. at 2, 52-53.
58. Justice Story's son, William Wetmore Story, reported that in 1819 the Justice "had
made up his mind that it was his duty, judicially and morally, to exert his utmost powers
to procure the annihilation of this trade...." I W. STORY, LIFE AND Lr-rRs or JosEPH
SToRY 348 (1851).
59. In The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409 (1824), slave trading again was the
offense, but what reached the Supreme Court was merely an unrelated and novel point of
admiralty law. Like The Margaret, the ship in this case was owned by United States citizens
in Baltimore, who sent her to Cuba and arranged a colorable conveyance to Spaniards; she
was then fitted out for the slave trade. On the way to Africa the ship was pursued by
hostile vessels, damaged, and forced to put into Baltimore to refit. There she was seized
and condemned for violating the "fitting out" provisions of the Slave Trade Acts. As in
The Margaret the District Court found the colorable sale did not remove the American
ownership, and "fitting out" was broadly construed and held to apply. The Supreme
Court upheld condemnation.
The remaining question, which occupied Justice Johnson in his opinion for the Court,
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The Emily and The Caroline0 also involved no slaves, but it did
involve direct violations of the Slave Trade Acts. To be effective, those
laws had to prohibit more than the actual shipping of slaves, since no
laden slave ship wasted any time getting clear of the African coast or
unloading in the Americas, and only along the coasts did patrols have
any real chance of finding and capturing slavers. However, empty
slavers did spend time lingering off Africa, waiting for a load of slaves
to be assembled and looking for a good moment to transfer them on
board.0 1 The legal response, contained in the earliest Slave Trade Act,
was to condemn and forfeit all ships which were fitted out with slave
trade equipment, and also to forbid the act of outfitting. 2 Slave ships
were therefore legally vulnerable from the moment they took on a
slaver's character.
Though there were arguments about what amounted to an out-
fitting for slave shipping, the essentials were distinctive and hard to
hide. Most obvious was a slave deck (or enough lumber to build one),
which was installed between the main deck and the hold and on
which the slaves were carried; no ordinary small merchant ship needed
such a deck. 6 Slavers also needed huge amounts of food and water,
unusual amounts of medicine to prevent epidemics among the weak-
ened and unimaginably crowded slaves, 4 weapons, iron gratings over
the hatches, and perhaps shackles. 5 It was much more common to cap-
ture a slaver in the process of outfitting, or one equipped but empty,
than it was to catch one full.
Both the Emily and the Caroline had been seized in Charleston,
concerned the repairers, who claimed a materialmen's lien against the ship (in fact, against
the proceeds of the judicial sale) for the work they had done.
Materialmen's liens were familiar in English admiralty law, and though the Supreme
Court had not passed on the point before 1824, the liens presumably existed in American
law as well. See ABaoi-r's LAW OF SHIPPING, supra note 43, at 160 n.l. There was also an
exception to the lien rule, of much more dubious heritage, which held that in a vessel's
home port a materialmen's lien did not exist except by operation of state law, which law
Maryland did not have. See The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438, 442 (1819). Finally,
it was assumed that if a repairer had a valid lien, that lien was not displaced by forfeiture
as long as the repairer had not connived in the illegal activity. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 417.
What Johnson tried to do, in a nice demonstration of the temptations and dangers of
anthropomorphism in admiralty practice, was to give the rationale for the rule and ex-
ception. He had to stretch to do it, since in the case before him he found no innocent
repairer or supplier to whom the rule and exception might have applied. 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 415-20. Johnson's explanation turned on the suggestion that "home port" was
a subjective state of mind rather than a fixed datum. Inadvertently, he thereby "opened
endless possibilities of refinement in which the courts wallowed for generations." See
generally G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 527-29 (1957).
60. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824).
61. W. HOWARD, supra note 34, at 18.
62. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 347.
63. W. HOWARD, supra note 34, at 16-17.
64. See id. at 17; 1 W. STORY, supra note 58, at 344-45.
65. W. HOWARD, supra note 34, at 15, 16.
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as they were in the process of fitting out for the slave trade. Their
main defense, relying on an 1813 Supreme Court ruling in the same
case,"" was that the libel of information drawn against them was im-
perfect in that it combined two charges in the alternative within one
count.67 Armed with Justice Story's gloss of the earlier ruling, s Justice
Thompson had no trouble disposing of the defense. He also swept
away the owners' claim of insufficient proof-in that neither ship had
finished being fitted out-with a broad interpretation of the statute
and a lecture on its purpose.6 The opinion 0 is a typical example of
hearty judicial support for the anti-slave trade campaign.
Another jurisdictional slave trade case, The Merino,"' was a judicial
footnote to the military and diplomatic daring of Andrew Jackson and
James Monroe. In 1818, as her Latin American colonies fought for
independence, Spain had only nominal control over her province of
Florida. The United States government had wanted the territory for
years, and was particularly annoyed after the War of 1812 that British
provocateurs had remained in Florida and encouraged the Seminole
Indians to skirmish with Americans across the border. Jackson had
marched into West Florida during the war, and in 1818 he saw his
chance again; he invaded the same area, took over the garrison at
Pensacola, and promptly executed two of the provocateurs, Ambrister
and Arbuthnot.72 Almost incidentally, his men also seized three slave
66. The Brig Caroline, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 496 (1813). The earlier ruling had struck
down a libel of information which had combined legal and illegal alternatives in one
count, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 500. The Court had clearly limited its ruling not to apply to
the kind of count which had been drawn on remand-not in the body of its opinion, but
in an unusual Note which Justice Story had supplied to the reporter, William Cranch,
and which Cranch had inserted in the front of the 1813 volume of reports. See id. at xv;
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 387.
67. One charge was "fitting out" for the slave trade; the other was "causing the vessel
to sail" in the slave trade. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 387. Both were violations of § 1 of the
1794 act and of the nearly identical § 2 of the 1807 act. See notes 30, 32 supra.
68. See note 66 supra.
69. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 388-90.
70. The Emily and The Caroline was Justice Thompson's first opinion for the Supreme
Court, and perhaps an easy case was assigned to him for that reason. But though the out-
come is clear, his effort fails to explain some small mysteries: for one, the 14-year lapse
between seizure and final adjudication (11 years since the first Supreme Court considera-
tion of the case). For another, the Caroline at least had had an interesting career after its
1810 seizure; its owner had gotten rid of the offending fitments when told they were
illegal, had then sailed the ship to Havana and sold it to a Spaniard who proceeded to fit
it out once again for the slave trade. See The Brig Caroline, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 496, 498
(1813). Whether any proceedings had been instituted based on those later facts, and how
the Caroline had once again come into the custody of the Circuit Court in South Carolina,
Thompson did not mention.
71. The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824).
72. See generally S. BEMIs, supra note 37, at 313-15. There is some question whether
Monroe authorized Jackson to invade Florida, see id. at 314 n.39, but he was clearly
leased with the results and used Jackson's reputation to diplomatic advantage. Id. at 313,
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ships, loaded with slaves, which had made the supposedly safe voyage
from Cuba to Pensacola. By the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, Jackson was a leading contender for the presidency, and by
the end of the year he had won the popular vote (though not the
office) in the national election.
The seized ships had been taken to the District Court of Alabama
for trial, and the owners raised the obvious jurisdictional issues. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred jurisdiction over seizures on district
courts "where the seizures are made . . . within their respective dis-
tricts, as well as upon the high seas"; they claimed their ships had
been seized not on the high seas or within the waters of a district,
but within the waters of a foreign nation.7 3
On appeal, Justice Washington wrote a terse opinion which dealt
firmly with the complicated situation. All three ships fell within the
statutory prohibition against the taking on board of Negroes "for the
purpose of holding, selling, or otherwise disposing of, such person
as a slave,"74 since all three had American crew members. After sum-
marily disposing of the jurisdiction problem with a single citation,7
he made careful individual rulings for each ship involved, covering
each of the slightly different factual and legal situations and throwing
out defective counts in the various libels of information70 with a
technical precision uncommon in Slave Trade Act prosecutions.
The ship owners argued that the statutory policy was "to prevent
... the bringing into bondage those persons who were free in their
own country; and, that since the condition of persons already slaves
cannot be changed or made worse, by their removal from one slave-
holding country to another, the acts of 1800 and 1818, ought not to
be so construed, as to prohibit citizens of the United States being
concerned in such removals." 77 At least for American citizens par-
ticipating in the slave trade, Washington found the purported policy
"very questionable" and affirmed the condemnation.78 But in inchoate
form, the owners' argument raised the question underlying the whole
effort against the slave trade: how far could the United States in-
terfere, outside its own waters, with a commerce which was legal in
nearby foreign waters?79 In Florida the question was acute, because
73. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 401-02.
74. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 90, § 4, 3 Stat. 450.
75. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 402-03.
76. Id. at 403-05.
77. Id. at 404.
78. Id. at 405.
79. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), resolved that question. See note
102 infra.
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one obvious purpose of shipping slaves from Cuba to Florida was to
smuggle them across the border into the United States. Washington
found a compromise answer of sorts by picking through the facts and
charges and finding that, in the case of one of the ships, the cargo
of slaves should be restored to the Spanish owner who had legal title
under Spanish law, although the slaves of other ships were forfeited
to the United States.80
Two other elements of The Merino are worth mention. One is the
appearance of the private seizor, in this case a Colonel Brooke, who
took possession of the Constitution in Pensacola harbor and brought
the ship to Mobile, where it was then boarded by a revenue agent.
The Slave Trade Acts, along with the Ship Registry Acts and others,
provided that anyone who seized and successfully prosecuted a ship
for a statutory violation would receive at least half the proceeds fol-
lowing condemnation and sale81-a device which promoted far better
enforcement than the Navy alone could have managed.82 The other
point is the automatic recitation by Justice Washington that "technical
niceties of the common law ... are not regarded in Admiralty [plead-
ing]."83 The proposition had a respectable case law history, but in the
slave trade area it supplied broad license for courts to tolerate a range
of procedural flaws in what were admittedly penal8 4 and essentially
criminal proceedings.
The Apollon s5 was not a slave trade case, but the facts are other-
wise similar enough to those in The Merino that a comparison helps
to isolate the difference which a slave trade context made to the
Court in 1824. The case involved a French ship carrying ordinary
cargo to the United States. On arrival off the port of Charleston, the
captain discovered that a special punitive duty against French ships
had just passed Congress,86 and to avoid it he turned south to Amelia
Island, just below the mouth of the St. Mary's River which formed
the border between Georgia and Florida. Later, on hearing that the
Spanish had established a new port of entry on a Spanish tributary
80. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 407-08. Justice Washington's solution may prefigure the
outcome in the landmark case of The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), in which
slaves captured by privateers were ordered returned to their original Portuguese owners.
81. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 4, 1 Stat. 347; Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51,
§ 1, 2 Stat. 70; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, §§ 1-4, 3 Stat. 450. See generally Act of Dec.
31, 1792, ch. I, § 16, 1 Stat. 287.
82. The disposition of the Constitution's cargo of slaves in The Merino indicates some
of the possible complications of the system.
83. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 401.
84. Id. at 403.
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
86. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4-5, 3 Stat. 605.
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of the St. Mary's, the Apollon's captain sailed her up-river and en-
tered her at the new port. There, in Spanish territory, she was seized
18 days later by the American tax collector for the nearest American
port, who claimed she had evaded the new duty.8 7 By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the government had conceded that
the seizure was unjustifiable (by failing to press an appeal from the
district court decree of restitution), and the only question before the
Court was a suit for damages.
Like Pensacola, Amelia Island was a well-known trouble spot on
the border with Spanish Florida, not because of Indian uprisings but
because it was a notorious lair for pirates and privateers. As part of
the fight against Spain, some of the revolutionary Latin American
governments had given commissions to privateers"" to take over coastal
territory in Florida to serve as bases for attacks on Spanish shipping,
and a Scotsman in 1817, sailing out of Savannah, had succeeded in
taking over Amelia Island for that purpose. Naturally, the buccaneers
did not limit themselves to Spanish shipping. President Monroe and
his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, quickly ordered American
military and naval forces to invade Amelia Island to drive out the
pirates, which they did in December 1817.89 The motive was more
acceptable than that for Jackson's adventure in West Florida, and the
scale was smaller, but the incident still caused diplomatic ripples. It
also left the territorial identity of the island in doubt, and the Apollon's
captain had prudently inquired at Charleston to make sure Amelia
Island was still considered Spanish before he took refuge there in June
1818.
In finding no probable cause for seizure, and therefore upholding
the damage award, Justice Story managed also to decide the question
of the punitive duty. Of course the Apollon intended to send her cargo
into the United States; 90 indeed her entire voyage since arriving off
Charleston had been under the direction of her cargo's American con-
signee. 91 But she never intended to enter an American port, and Story
held such intent to be a necessary element of the statutory offense;
passing through the international waters of the St. Mary's was not
enough. 92 If the Apollon intended to sail her cargo into the United
States herself without paying the duty, that would be smuggling, but
Story pointed out a perfectly legal alternative: to transfer the cargo
87. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 363-65.
88. For a fuller explanation of privateering arrangements, see p. 784 infra.
89. See generally S. BEMIS, supra note 37, at 307.
90. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 375.
91. Id. at 364.
92. Id. at 367-72.
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to American or other foreign vessels for the final short step into the
United States. Nor would that evade the intent of the statute, since
"the expense of the transshipment must have been supposed by Con-
gress to be, in ordinary cases, a full equivalent to the increased duty."
The policy of the act was to burden French commerce, not to bar it,
and that policy was "as completely effected by compelling French ships
to perform circuitous voyages, and thus to incur the disadvantages of
transshipments, as by payment of the tonnage duty."9 3
Story's attitude toward maritime regulations in a pure revenue con-
text contrasts markedly with his approach when slaves were involved.
In The Apollon he wrote,
We cannot enter into political considerations, on points of na-
tional policy, or the authority of the government to defend its
own rights against the frauds meditated by foreigners against our
revenue system, through the instrumentality and protection of a
foreign sovereignty. Whatever may be the rights of the govern-
ment, upon principles of the law of nations, to redress wrongs of
this nature, and whatever the powers of Congress to pass suitable
laws to cure any defects in the present system, our duty lies in
a more narrow compass; and we must administer the laws as they
exist, without straining them to reach public mischiefs, which they
were never designed to remedy. 94
Story added:
It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were
authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the pur-
pose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It
cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such
a clear violation of the laws of nations. The arrest of the offending
vessel must, therefore, be restrained to places where our jurisdic-
tion is complete, to our own waters, or to the ocean, the common
highway of all nations.9 5
Even if smuggling were the purpose, jurisdiction should be strictly
observed:
But, admit that he had an intention of illegal trade, how could
that intention, not carried into effect within our jurisdiction, af-
ford probable cause of seizure in a foreign territory?9 6
93. Id. at 375. Warren suggests the decision "aided in the maintenance of friendly
relations" with France. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 581.
94. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 366.
95. Id. at 371.
96. Id. at 375.
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Yet Story had no trouble approving the Pensacola seizures in The
Merino, though in that case there was no evidence at all of intent to
import into the United States. And in his famous 1822 opinion in
La Jeune Eugenie, he had implicitly argued for the broadest possible
jurisdiction over slave trade offenses, since he was willing to find
them illegal under international law.97 Though not for the last time,
the problem of slavery demanded special interpretations of the law
in 1824.
B. Privateers
Like some of the slave trade cases, the case of The Monte Allegre8
involved a small legal matter irrelevant to, but growing out of, a major
international problem: in this case, privateering.°9 During the War of
1812 the United States had commissioned privateers to capture British
merchant ships, and public sentiment ran in favor of the device. Later
in the decade the revolutionary governments of Latin America offered
commissions against Spanish shipping, which many American adven-
turers accepted. For a while longer the public overlooked the avarice
of the privateers because of sympathy for the revolutionaries, but by
1820 the new governments were well established, and privateering was
in disfavor.100 Secretary of State Adams, once a believer in "a militia
moving upon the water," changed his mind on seeing the abuses of
the South American privateers, and he included its abolition in the
abortive 1824 treaty with Great Britain.10 1
Although the major revolutionary governments in Latin America
restrained their privateers as they established sovereignty, splinter
groups of rebels continued to grant commissions with abandon. One
such was a group calling itself the Banda Oriental, or Oriental Re-
public, under the leadership of Jos6 Artigas, which claimed an un-
certain amount of territory in what is now Uruguay. The signature
of Artigas was carried by a number of privateers in both North and
South American waters which were still operating after 1821.102
97. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (No. 15,551) (1822).
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 616 (1824).
99. "The privateer...was a ship owned and fitted out at private expense for the
purpose of preying on the enemy's commerce to the profit of her owners, and bearing a
commission, or letter of marque, authorizing her to do so, from the government." E.
MACLAY, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS 7 (1899).
100. See, e.g., J. GALLISON, THE PRACrICE OF PRIVATEERING CONSIDERED (1820). Sce gen-
erally I C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 569-86.
101. See generally S. BEMns, supra note 37, at 305, 346-55, 436-45; 1 C. WARREN, sUpra
note 4, at 570 & n.l.
102. One happy coincidence of the 1824 Term is that the facts in its admiralty cases,
including The Monte Allegre, anticipate each part of the fact situation in The Antelope,
the landmark case in 1825 which determined that slavery was not a violation of inter-
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The Monte Allegre was a Portuguese ship captured in 1818 by an
American-owned privateer, La For tuna, under a commission from the
Oriental Republic. 103 The ship was taken to Baltimore, where it was
libelled by the Consul-General of Portugal, appearing on behalf of
the unknown Portuguese owner. La Fortuna was found to have vio-
lated the neutrality acts which prohibited American ships from at-
tacking ships of any country not at war with the United States,' 04
and the Monte Allegre was ordered returned to the Portuguese Con-
sul-General. The Supreme Court through Chief Justice Marshall af-
firmed in 1822, in a two-page opinion which clearly settled the il-
legality of American participation in privateering, under whatever
arrangement.1 0
The 1824 case of The Monte Allegre dealt with the judicial sale
of the Monte Allegre's cargo under interlocutory order, a common
practice where the cargo might otherwise spoil before final disposi-
tion of the case. Thomas Tenant, a merchant, bought more than 600
bales of tobacco at the judicial sale, for $15,500, and later discovered
that it was largely rotten; he sued for damages on an implied war-
ranty. The cause might have seemed minor and the outcome certain,
but the Court heard elaborate argument before holding that there
were no warranties in judicial sales and rendering judgment of no
damages. 100 In the official report of the case, Wheaton included a
disproportionate amount of the arguments of counsel, perhaps because
he felt the inadequacy of Justice Thompson's relatively crude and un-
learned opinion to explain the outcome. Another curiosity of the case
was the appearance of the Attorney General, 07 arguing against the
judicial officer who made the sale and in favor of Tenant. His theme
national law, and hence that American jurisdiction over slave traders was limited. As a
result, when the Justices came to consider the very complicated facts in The Antelope
the following year, there was relatively little chance of distraction or confusion by the
several legal side issues which the complications could have produced.
The Antelope, a Spanish ship loaded with slaves, was captured off Africa by an Amer-
ican privateer from Baltimore, under commission from the Oriental Republic. Under the
control of the privateers, and carrying slaves from several other of their prizes as well, the
Antelope sailed to Florida. There she was captured, off the coast but outside U.S. territorial
waters, by an American revenue cutter, who brought her in to the District Court in
Savannah. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 123-24.
The central issue in the case was whether to return the slaves to their original Spanish
and Portuguese owners (actually, again, to the Consuls-General). To reach it, however,
Marshall had to cut through the law of privateering and prizes, neutrality, and extra-
territorial seizure. He did so in summary fashion, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 119-123, perhaps
because the same issues had arisen in The Monte Allegre, The Apollon, and The Merino.
103. See The Monte Allegre, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 520 (1822).
104. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447.
105. The Monte Allegre, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 520 (1822).
106. The cause came up yet a third time in 1826. See Chace v. Vasquez, 26 U.S. (11
Wheat.) 429 (1826).
107. At this time, William Wirt.
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was that the Portuguese Consul-General should not reap a windfall
at the expense of an American citizen. Had the rotten tobacco been
discovered before sale, the Consul-General would have realized only
an estimated $4,500,108 with no grounds for complaint. 09
The case of The Fanny"0 had nearly the same background as The
Monte A llegre: American privateers operating against Portuguese ships
under commission from Artigas. These privateers, however, were not
caught; they had taken their captured cargo to the Virgin Islands,
sold it, and disappeared. The American consul in St. Thomas, Na-
thaniel Levy, was one of the purchasers-he bought some 4,000 hides
from the privateers-and when he shipped them to Baltimore for sale,
they were seized as Portuguese property, and so decreed by the dis-
trict court."' On appeal Levy attacked the disposition of the hides,
and a subsidiary question was raised over who should pay the charges
for shipping the hides from St. Thomas to Baltimore: Levy or the
Portuguese Consul-General, standing in again for the unknown orig-
inal owner. 1 2 Justice Washington delivered a lucid, surehanded opin-
ion which reduced both questions to the issue of good faith pur-
chase by Levy, and remanded the case to the circuit court for better
fact finding. The formal decree outlined each possible outcome and
virtually guaranteed no further appeals." 3 Both The Fanny and The
Monte A llegre reaffirmed the Supreme Court's consistent position
"that the taking of a prize by a ship fitted out or acting in violation
of the neutrality of the United States would be held invalid by our
Courts, and restitution . . . decreed.""1
4
II. Western Land
The Supreme Court in 1824 decided a number of cases dealing
with what Wheaton 1 5 in his official reports classified as "local law." 110
108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 617.
109. Id. at 638-40.
110. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 658 (1824).
111. Id. at 659-62.
112. Among other arguments, counsel for Portugal urged that the Oriental Republic
was not an acknowledged government at war with Portugal, and hence that the privateers
in the case were really pirates (and thus subject to the death penalty). 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 662-63. The Court's agreement would have been a severe blow to the Artigas revolt,
but it ignored the argument in favor of a more modest ratio decidendi. Portugal offered
the same argument and got the same response earlier, in The Gran Para, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 471 (1822).
113. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 672-73.
114. See I C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 573 9. n.l.
115. See note 14 supra.
116. Neither Dallas nor Cranch used general subject headings either above the case
name or on the index page of the reports. Wheaton inaugurated the former in 14 U.S.
(I Wheat.) (1816) and the latter in 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) (1817).
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The great majority involved questions of land law-either directly,
as between competing claimants in an ejectment proceeding, or in-
directly, such as in probate. There were 15 such cases; by contrast,
there were four negotiable instruments and three contracts cases in the
same term. The disproportion may reflect the state of the American
economy, in which wealth was primarily in land and not in mov-
ables.117 In addition, Justice Todd, highly knowledgeable about Ken-
tucky law, had been ill the previous term, and the Court had retained
on its docket a number of Kentucky cases."18 These frequently involved
land grants or property law questions concerning property obtained by
a land grant; thus Todd's return in 1824 in part explains the dispro-
portion.
The most important land eases involved various claimants fighting
over land which one or both of them claimed under warrants, mili-
tary or treasury, issued by one of the states or the national govern-
ment. Large numbers of such claimants held vast amounts of land 19
whose ownership could have been affected by a Supreme Court de-
cision.
In Doddridge v. Thompson 20 the Court faced a nearly insoluble
problem, choosing between competing claims in what was called the
Virginia Military Reserve in Ohio. Doddridge cannot be understood
apart from the history of the origin of the Reserve and Congress's
attempts to develop a national land policy after the adoption of the
Constitution in 1789.
From the time of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which offered
"unappropriated crown" lands to those who volunteered to fight for
His Majesty's Government in the French and Indian Wars,' 2' the
These local law cases came to the Court under its diversity jurisdiction or under other
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which left the case to be determined under the
aw of the locale. See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (jurisdiction
predicated on the plaintiffs' alienage pursuant to § 11 of the Judiciary Act, I Stat. 73,
78-79).
117. It also reflects the commercial depression in the United States following the Panic
of 1819. See generally G. DANGERFIELD, THE AWAKENINC OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1815-
1828, at 72-96 (1965); M. ROTHBARD, THE PANIC OF 1819 (1962).
118. In a letter dated March 14, 1823, to Justice Todd, Justice Story wrote in reference
to Todd's illness: "We have all missed you exceedingly during this term, and particularly
in the Kentucky Causes, many of whicI have been continued solely on account of your
absence." I W.W. STORY, supra note 58, at 422. In his "Sketch" of Justice Todd written
after Todd's death Story said, "In his knowledge of the local law of Kentucky, he was
excelled by few; and his brethren drew largely upon his resources to administer that law,
in the numerous cases which then crowded the docket of the Supreme Court from that
judicial circuit." MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOsEPH STORY 817 (W. Story ed. 1852).
119. The military bounty grants by the federal government alone were numerous and
generous. As of 1907 approximately 16,663 warrants had issued in the amount of 2,165,000
acres of land for revolutionary war service. As of the same date 29,186 warrants had issued
in the amount of 4,845,920 acres of land for service during the War of 1812. B. HIBBARD,
A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 132 (1939).
120. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 469 (1824).
121. P. TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM 1785-1820, at 230 (1910).
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American colonies had rewarded their veterans with generous grants
from the public domain. The Continental Congress offered land first
to Hessians who deserted 122 and later to all men who served in the
Colonial Army. 23 The gifts were in the form of nonassignable war-
rants that the claimant could present in return for a portion of the
public domain. 24 Such generosity created problems. First, the Con-
tinental Congress and later the Confederation and the United States
owned no territory; in order to honor the warrants Congress had to
depend on the states to supply land. 2 5 Second, since the land was
for the most part unsurveyed, Congress's unspecific largesse inevitably
produced a welter of conflicting claims. The second problem was
remedied in part under the Confederation by the Act of 1785, which
required a survey before confirmation of a grant.' 26
The first problem, lack of land, was resolved by a series of seven
deeds of cession between the various states and the national govern-
ment. In return for ceding their western territorial claims, these states
exacted a variety of concessions; the most fateful required the national
government to recognize certain "reservations" by the original states
of land in the ceded territories.
In 1784 Virginia ceded all of its claims in the West but retained
two reserves. The parties understood that these were to be used by
Virginia to satisfy claimants who had served either in the Colonial
or in the Virginia Army during the Revolution. The smaller of the
two was in Kentucky and was to be exhausted before the state could
issue warrants redeemable in the second reserve, situated between the
Scioto and Little Miami rivers in Ohio. 2 7 Unfortunately the deed of
cession was hastily drawn. It failed to state that veterans of the Virginia
Army were entitled to claim land, it took no account of unexpired
Indian claims, and it neglected to delimit the boundaries of the re-
serves.' 28 Virginia had actually begun to issue warrants in the Ohio
reserve before the cession; the reserve was in any case officially opened
for federal disposition by statute on August 10, 1790.129
After cessions by the states had given the federal government land
to honor its military land bounties, Congress passed a series of statutes
122. A4. at 231.
123. Id. at 232.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 236.
127. Id. at 327.
128. Id. at 328.
129. Id. at 331.
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that in effect put the excess, including the rest of Ohio, up for sale.130
The Act of June 1, 1796, made federal warrants transferable before
entry and further provided that warrants had to be presented by Janu-
ary 1, 1800. Later extensions' 1' kept the warrants valid beyond 1824.
Doddridge v. Thompson was one result of the drafting errors in
the Virginia cession of 1784. Both plaintiff and defendant claimed
under patents issued by the United States. 32 Plaintiff's Virginia war-
rant was older; it had originally been obtained by an officer of the
Virginia Army and had, presumably by sale or gift, come into plain-
tiff's hands. The defendant had purchased his warrant from the United
States. The patents, as issued, overlapped. The case was "agreed" in
the circuit court which registered a pro forma judgment for the
defendant. 133
The controversy resulted from the cession's failure to delimit the
boundaries of the Virginia Military Reserve. The cession said only that
"no part of the land included between the rivers called Little Miami
and Scioto, on the northwest side of the river Ohio" might be used
by the national government until Virginia's military claimants were
satisfied. 134 One William Ludlow had attempted in 1802 to draw a
line connecting the sources of the two rivers; 135 it later appeared that
his line followed a course too far to the east. In 1804 Congress passed
a law setting up a procedure to ascertain the boundaries of the re-
serve. It provided that if Virginia voted to accept Ludlow's line within
two years, then land west of that boundary could be sold by the na-
tional government. Though Virginia would not accept the line, the
national government apparently went ahead anyway and sold land to
its west. In the meantime Virginia claimants, including the predecessor
of the Doddridge plaintiff, had already received warrants redeemable
130. Congress first required a survey, id. at 236, and then set the terms and conditions
for sale, id. at 238.
131. Id. at 242.
132. A warrant gave an inchoate right to a certain amount of land. A patent was
issued by the responsible administrative authority (in this case the United States because
Ohio was a territory) after presentation of a warrant and usually after entry and a survey,
which in the case of the Ohio reserve was commissioned and paid for by each claimant.
Unlike the federal land there was no organized survey.
133. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 470. Although today universally repudiated as a collusive
device for obtaining a ruling by an appellate court, the pro forma judgment was still in
good standing in 1824. The range of cases in which an appellate court would allow the
parties in effect to confess a judgment without trial in order to get to the higher court is
unclear.
134. B. HiBBARD, supra note 119, at 122 (1939).
135. Ludlow failed because he ran into land with unexpired Indian claims and prob-
ably unexpelled Indian inhabitants. Congress and Virginia had apparently agreed to the
dedication of this reserve without negotiating a purchase from these Indians. The whole
problem of drawing a line between the origins of the two rivers was further complicated
by the fact that source of the Scioto (the easternmost river) was west of the source of the
Little Miami, P. TREAT, supra note 121, at 333.
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for any land in the reserve, including, presumably, west of Ludlow's
line.
In 1812 Congress made another attempt to solve the problem.13 6 It
brought together commissioners of Virginia and the federal govern-
ment, who hired one Charles Robertslar to draw a line that would
connect the sources of the two rivers. He came up with a line to
the west of Ludlow's line that would have extinguished the claims
of people like the defendant in Doddridge who had paid the gov-
ernment cash for a federal warrant. The two sets of commissioners
could not agree even on this line, and things stood as they had before
enactment of the statute in 1812.
The plaintiff, the Virginia claimant, relied on the language of the
original cession, as interpreted by Roberts's line, while the defendant
(federal claimant) attempted to show that somehow Ludlow's line
was binding on Virginia. In an opinion that squarely confronts the
issue between the two parties, Chief Justice Marshall surprisingly re-
lied on a technicality to decide the case. 38 Marshall held that in the
Act of 1812 Congress had no intention to establish Ludlow's line by
fiat; Virginia could have made the line binding by agreement with
the federal commissioners, but no agreement was reached. Since Con-
gress did not so intend, it also could not have intended to "annul"
valid prior titles, like plaintiff's here.139 The Court reversed, holding
for the plaintiff on the ground that his Virginia warrant was pre-
eminent because it was older than the defendant's.
Two important characteristics of the case should be noted. 40 First,
Doddridge did not make a final choice between Ludlow's line and
Roberts's line; Congress and Virginia were left free to work out a
solution.141 Second, it gave the immediate victory to the state claimant
136. Id. at 334.
137. Id. at 334-35.
138. Marshall properly ignored the fact that in 1818 Congress had voted to establish
the Ludlow line as the authoritative line to the old Indian boundary and the Roberts
line from the old Indian boundary. Id. at 353. See Act of Apr. 11, 1818, ch. 47, 3 Stat. 423.
139. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 479. Marshall also rejected a hypertechnical argument made
by the defendant concerning the Act of March 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 424, which had extended the
statute of limitations for making locations. Id. at 480-83.
140. The resolution did provoke congressional action. On April 6, 1824, Rep. Vance of
Ohio made a motion, which carried, to appoint a committee "to inquire into the ex-
pediency of granting relief to such persons, purchasers of the public lands, lying between
Ludlow's and Roberts's lines, in the State of Ohio, as are liable to be evicted from the
same, on the principles of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, made at
their last term, in the case of Doddridge...." 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 2172 (1824). A bill was
reported out by the committee, read twice and laid on the table on May 4, 1824. Id. at
2541. A petition by warrant holders was presented to Congress on this matter on May 6,
1824. Id. at 2551. The bill was read a third time and debated, id. at 2576-78 and passed,
id. at 2586, on May 10, 1824.
141. The eventual solution was that Congress appropriated $62,515,250 in 1830 to pay
double claimants. P. TRaAT, supra note 121, at 335.
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at a time when the court's nationalist decisions had provoked re-
sentment. 142
Doddridge is a dramatic case in that it squarely presented a ques-
tion of cession interpretation, although the resolution was less than
dramatic. Most land cases coming to the Court seemed to involve
more mundane questions of property law. In fact, however, under the
surface of these cases lay significant issues of western land policy.
Kerr v. Devisees of Moon143 provides an example. The devisees of
Archeleus Moon filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Ohio praying that court to order defendant Kerr to convey
"evidences of title" to certain parcels of land to the devisees. The facts
in the case were fairly straightforward. At the time of his death Moon
held warrants to 4,000 acres of land in the Virginia Military Reserve in
Ohio, the same reserve as in Doddridge. Defendant Kerr derived his
title through one Robert Price who, it was alleged, held the warrants
of Moon as assignee of the devisees of Archibald [sic] Moon. 44 The
Circuit Court of Ohio held that defendant Kerr should convey the
property to the devisees and that they must pay him for the cost of lo-
cating and surveying the land and for taxes paid while in occupation.
On appeal Kerr argued that the Circuit Court of Ohio had erred
in allowing its decision to be governed by the result of a probate pro-
ceeding in Kentucky. Justice Washington found this convincing: "It is
an unquestionable principle of general law, that the title to, and the
disposition of real property, must be exclusively subject to the laws of
the country where it is situated . . . " in this case Ohio. 45 The Court
reversed and remanded for a decision in accordance with the principles
of Ohio law.
Kerr might be viewed as a simple choice of law case. The land was
in Ohio; Ohio law should govern. In fact, however, it raises issues
of national land policy just as sharply as Doddridge. One of the re-
current issues which Congress and the landed states faced was whether
142. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), was fresh in the minds of many
in the Old Dominion, and the unrest sparked by Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1
(1823), was unabated in Kentucky and Congress.
143. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 565 (1824).
144. The devisees alleged that Price's assignments were fraudulent because obtained
from the first wife of Moon and her children, who had been disinherited. Moon's will was
executed and probated in Fayette County, Kentucky. The clerk's office with the proven
copy of Moon's will had burned down in 1802 or 1803 so the devisees had introduced a
copy in the Circuit Court. Id. at 568. In his answer Kerr stated that he was a purchaser
for value, that he had taken the warrants, made entry on 3,723 acres and commissioned a
survey.
145. Id. at 570. The quotation from Washington and indeed the attitude of the Court
on a number of matters points to the inevitability of the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which held that "general" 'law, rather
than the law of the locale, would govern diversity actions in the federal courts.
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land warrants should be assignable. At first CongTess had decided
against assignability. Constant pressure from veterans who wanted
money more than land led CongTess to reverse itself in 1788 and make
national bounty warrants transferable. 146 As a result of this decision,
the frontier regions were not quickly settled by hearty veterans, 14 7 as
it was once hoped, and many of the warrants ended up in the hands
of speculators.' 48 After the War of 1812, Congress again made bounty
warrants nonassignable.' 49 The transferable revolutionary war warrants
continued in circulation through the 1824 term, however, because
Cong-ress kept extending the deadline for presentation150
Kerr would never have come up if warrants had not been assign-
able; Kerr's title was based on an assignment by the alleged devisees
to Price. The Court could not change Congress's basic decision in this
regard, but its decision in Kerr was at least an attempt to restrict some-
what the litigation that inevitably ensued, given assignable warrants.
It was rational from a policy perspective to seek such restriction, but
toward that end the Court had to engage in a certain amount of legal
irrationality. The devisees argued that warrants were not realty but
personalty. 151 Justice Washington held that warrants were not per-
sonalty and that the "subject matter of the devise was land,"'1 2 add-
ing that even if the warrants were personalty they still had to be
probated in Ohio. Under the common law, this conclusion was un-
supportable; personalty goes with the testator's domiciliary estate, if
found with him at his domicile at the time of death.
153
146. P. TREAT, supra note 121, at 238.
147. Id. at 242.
148. Id. at 245.
149. Id. at 248.
150. Id. at 242.
151. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 570.
152. Id. at 571. It is true that contracts to sell a specific piece of land are somewhat
different from normal contracts. They are subject to the Statute of Frauds. 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.3, at 9-13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). If one qualifies under the Statute
of Frauds then the vendor is deemed to have a "vendor's lien" and the purchaser's rights
are deemed to go to his devisees by a hocus pocus called an equitable conversion. Id. §§
11.26-11.27, at 69-78. Casner cites Langford v. Pitt, 2 P. Wms. 630 (Ch. 1731), as support
for the proposition that the purchaser's contract right passes by devise, although in
Lessee of Smith v. Jones, 4 Ohio 115 (1829), the contrary was upheld. The thinking behind
Langford may have affected the decision on this point in Kerr.
153. The word unsupportable may seem a bit harsh, but the fact is that all the
authority is contrary to the Court's opinion on this matter. Justice Story wrote in his
treatise on conflicts of law, "It follows as a natural consequence of the rule, which we
have been considering (that personal property has no locality), that the laws of the
owner's domicile should in all cases determine the validity of every transfer, alienation or
disposition made by the owner, whether it be inter vivos or post inortem." J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 383, at 315 (1834). Story does cite Kerr to
support the proposition that if this were realty then the law of situs would govern. Id. §
435, at 370. See generally Wilkins v. Eillet, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 740 (1869); Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
In support of his statement on this matter Washington says of Doe v. McFarland, 13
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Although the legal reasoning of Washington's decision is open to at-
tack, the decision does make common sense. With large numbers of
assignable warrants outstanding, it was imperative, if Ohio land titles
were ever to be settled, that the land warrants be probated in Ohio.
This would at least give some notice to people with warrants seeking
land to enter. It was a crude registration device, but the Court was
not a legislature and it could not order what was really needed: a
survey of the Virginia Military Reserve and implementation of a com-
prehensive registration system.
Washington's decision in Kerr was profoundly influenced by the
uproar that had developed as a result of the Court's decision in Green
v. Biddle,1 4 decided the previous term.15 The Court in Green struck
down, as impairing the obligation of contract, a Kentucky law which
required a true owner of land, before ejecting an occupant, to in-
demnify the occupant for improvements the latter made while in pos-
session.50 The Court held that this law impaired the contract between
Virginia and Kentucky that had been entered when Virginia sur-
rendered its claims to Kentucky,15 7 by curtailing the common law
rights that land owners would have had under Virginia law at the
time when Virginia had ceded its lands to Kentucky. In the compact
Virginia had expressly sought to protect titles created prior to Ken-
U.S. (9 Cranch) 151 (1815), that "it was decided that letters testamentary gave to the
executors no authority to sue for the personal estate of the testator, out of the jurisdiction
of the power by which the letters were granted." Cited at 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 571. It is
true that there are dicta in Doe to support this statement; it is also true that the square
holding in Doe, which Washington Ignores, favored parties like the devisees in Kerr.
What actually happened in Doe was that the devisees under a Virginia will were permitted
to sue in ejectment to oust the defendant from land located in Kentucky even though the
will had never been probated in Kentucky. If anything, the holding in Doe cuts against
Washington's rigidity in Kerr.
154. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
155. The same can be said of Marshall's opinion in Stephens i. McCargo, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 502 (1824). Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), was first argued in 1821,
and the Supreme Court held the Kentucky statute unconstitutional in an opinion written
by Justice Story which was handed down on March 8, 1821. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4,
at 637. That decision is not found in 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.). The state of Kentucky instructed
its counsel, Henry Clay, to ask for a reargument and the case was reargued in March
1822. Justice Washington's opinion was not released, however, until February 27, 1823. 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 69. Warren believes that the decision was held over for political reasons.
1 C. WARREN, supra, at 638.
156. For a full discussion of Green v. Biddle, see 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 637-48.
One of the most disturbing aspects of the case to its Republican opponents was their
claim that the majority opinion was supported by only a minority of the Court. Johnson
dissented, Marshall did not sit and Todd and Livingston were too ill to participate ac-
cording to these people. Id. at 640. This led to a very serious effort to require that some
fixed minimum number of Justices adhere to an opinion in order for it to invalidate a
state law. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by Senator Martin Van Buren
of New York, reported a bill on March 11, 1824, that provided that no state law could be
voided without the concurrence of five of the seven Justices. The bill was tabled. See id.
at 663-65.
157. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 91.
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tucky statehood. The opposing side argued that this compact was not
a contract and, in the alternative, that if it were, then it was repugnant
to Article I, § 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution since Congress had
not consented. The Court rejected both of these contentions; it held
that a compact could be a contract and that Congress's vote to admit
Kentucky was consent. 158
Justice Johnson, dissenting in Green, foresaw the problems the
Court's decision would create.1 9 The effect of the decision was to
make land matters in states like Kentucky incredibly complex. Land
located, entered, and granted before statehood would be protected
forever by the contract clause, but with respect to other land the
Kentucky legislature was free to legislate. In Johnson's words, the de-
cisions left the nation "to float on a sea of uncertainty as to the
extent of the legislative power of Kentucky over the territory held
under Virginia grants . ... ,160
Frontier sentiment strongly favored laws that protected occupants
and debtors; thus it was no coincidence that western senators led a
renewed drive to curtail Supreme Court power.' 6 ' The Congress de-
bated several limiting measures in 1824. Green thus did more than
complicate Kentucky land law; it resulted in heavy political pressure
on the Court to restrain its nationalist proclivities. This pressure un-
doubtedly played a part in the Court's decision to avoid a decision
in Doddridge, to remand in Kerr and to affirm in Stephens v.
McCargo.162
158. Id. at 92.
159. The only biography of Justice Johnson curiously fails to make sense of the ap-
parent contradictions in his legal thinking. D. MORCAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE
FIRsT DISSENTER (1954). Some of his opinions, including his concurrence in Gibbons v.
Ogden, are so broad as to wipe out state powers; in other opinions-for example Green v.
.Biddle-he exalted state sovereignty. He was an ardent Republican and any explanation
of his inconsistencies would perhaps begin with the proposition that his political con-
nections may have restrained his intellectual proclivities.
160. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 103. Johnson's dissent in Green recalls his earlier dissent in
another important land claims case, Fletcher v. Peck, 100 U.S. (6 Cianch) 87, 143 (1810).
which concerned the Yazoo controversy.
161. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 653-85.
162. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 502 (1824). According to Warren, the pressure also led the
court to hold for a year a decision on another Kentucky statute that favored debtors,
which was argued during the 1824 term. In 1825, the Court released its decision. Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). It eviscerated a Kentucky statute which required
a plaintiff who obtained an execution to "endorse" on the execution that the tremendously
depreciated notes of state banks would be an acceptable form of payment. The Court did
not strike down this statute but held that proceedings in the federal courts (such as an
execution) were a matter of federal law and therefore the federal courts could continue
as a part of their supervisory functions to insist that all executions be satisfied in specie.
The Kentucky courts were still free to apply the law if any plaintiffs were foolish enough
to appear in them. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 648-49.
The Court also delayed Ogden v. Saunders, which involved the validity of state in-
solvency laws and was argued in 1824. Through a series of delays and one reargument the
Court did not hand down its decision until 1827. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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Stephens v. McCargo proved what Justice Johnson predicted in his
dissent in Green. Once the Virginia claims were frozen in the Devo-
nian amber of the contract clause, litigation multiplied rather than
abated. Furthermore, the difficulties of the Court in this sensitive
area were compounded by the result in Green; each new case drew
the Court deeper into state affairs.
In Stephens, as in Doddridge, the Court found a way to preserve
the state law, protect a state claimant, and avoid another confrontation.
The facts were complex. The predecessors of Stephens, the appellant
and defendant, obtained a treasury warrant to land in Kentucky in
accordance with Virginia law. Entry occurred on May 30, 1780, and
the holding was confirmed by a grant on March 1, 1784. McCargo
and others (respondents-plaintiffs) claimed under two chains of title.' 03
The first chain began with issuance of a preemption warrant 6 4 to one
Benjamin Harrison on April 26, 1780; entry with surveyor occurred on
June 5, 1786, confirmed by grant on February 10, 1789. The second
chain began with the entry of Richard Barbour under a valid treasury
warrant on May 10, 1780, followed by a survey in 1786 and confirmed
by a patent in 1787.
Marshall's opinion for the Court easily upheld the claims derived
from Barbour, since Barbour's entry under a treasury warrant pre-
ceded that of Stephens's predecessor. Harrison's successors had a more
difficult time and in holding for them Marshall and the Court glossed
over a flaw in Virginia land legislation. The Virginia Assembly had
periodically extended the time during which a preemption warrant
carried superior rights, but through an oversight there was apparently
a short gap in the statutes. 16 Stephens claimed that during this gap
his inchoate right to the land (obtained by entry on May 30, 1780,
whereas Harrison's successor did not enter until June 5, 1786) had
become vested.' 0 6 Virginia law and the sentiment of the frontier
strongly favored the holder of a preemption warrant (Harrison) as
against the holder of a treasury warrant (Stephens's predecessor). If
there had been no flaw in the legislation the Court could have adopted
the popular position by favoring Harrison's successors.
Stephens had one advantage over Harrison. He had obtained his
163. The Court very quickly brushed over the fact that it violated an old rule of
equity to combine two claims in one bill. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 504.
164. Virginia granted preemption warrants to "meritorious individuals, as a reward
for the fatigue and hazard encountered in exploring the country." Preemption warrants
to a specific tract of land prevented the public sale of that land and gave the holder of a
preemption warrant a superior title. Id. at 507.
165. Id. at 506.
166. Id.
795
The Yale Law Journal
patent first, and a prior Supreme Court decision, Hoofnagle v. An-
derson,1 7 written by Chief Justice Marshall, had seemed to make
prior issuance of a patent conclusive on the question of title. Mar-
shall wrote: "It is not doubted that a patent appropriates land. Any
defects in the preliminary steps, which are required by law, are cured
by the patent. It is a title from its date, and [is] conclusive against
all those whose rights did not commence previous to its emanation." 108
In Stephens Marshall frankly admitted, "The Court has felt great dif-
ficulty on this point,"'' 1 9 the point being the Hoofnagle precedent.
Stephens's patent was prior to McCargo's, but McCargo's preemption
warrant was preferred by Virginia law.
Marshall managed to find for McCargo and the preemption war-
rant by fiat: the legislature of Virginia created Harrison's preemptive
right by statute and it had a right to extend it.170 The gap appar-
ently had no effect at all. The Court found some support for this
holding in Kentucky decisions,' 7 ' thereby illustrating the difficulty
in implementing Green v. Biddle. Green apparently held that Vir-
ginia law was dominant over the decisions of Kentucky courts. In
Stephens, Virginia law controlled, but the Kentucky courts apparently
could decide what the Virginia law was.
Not all the land claims cases decided during the 1824 term involved
the Virginia cession. 72 North Carolina's cession (which became the
state of Tennessee) contributed its share of litigation. After consider-
able resistance North Carolina, like Virginia, had ceded its western
land claims to the national government by statute in 1789173 upon
the following conditions: State military land bounties had to be
honored from the ceded land; "all rights and entries under North
Carolina'grants should be preserved"; 74 and North Carolina reserved
the right to complete all of its grants. 75 These conditions resulted in
a massive legal tangle, particularly after Tennessee was admitted in
1796,176 because North Carolina, Tennessee and the United States
167. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 212 (1822).
168. Id. at 214.
169. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 510.
170. Id. at 512.
171. Id. at 513.
172. There was one other Kentucky land claim case not discussed above, Meredith v.
Picket, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 573 (1824). The decision is two pages long and the statement of
facts is so abbreviated as to render the holding incomprehensible. It appears to have in-
volved a simple question of interpreting the language of the entry. Id. at 574.
173. Congress accepted the cession on April 2, 1790. P. TREAT, supra note 121, at 343.
174. Id. at 343-44.
175. Id. The pertinent portions of the cession are quoted in Burton's Lessee v.
Williams, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 529, 535 (1818).
176. P. TRAxr, supra note 121, at 346.
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were all engaged to some extent in disposing of Tennessee land.1 77
This situation was intolerable; the Supreme Court, led by Justice John-
son (who was to dissent in Green), had therefore attempted to clear
up the situation in Burton's Lessee v. Williams178 in 1818. The Court
held that by its deed of cession to the United States, North Carolina
had surrendered its right to make grants in Tennessee to the United
States. Although Burton did a great deal to prevent North Carolina's
interference with Tennessee land, it did not entirely obviate prob-
lems like those Green created, as a number of 1824 cases demonstrate.
Danforth v. Wear 179 was probably orie of the cases in which a de-
cision had been delayed until Justice Todd's return to the Court.'8 0
Danforth, plaintiff in ejectment, claimed under a North Carolina
grant land in Tennessee in the possession of Wear. The facts are not
clear, but it would seem from Johnson's opinion that the Indian title
to at least part'of the Danforth grant was unextinguished at the time
of the grant. North Carolina had, in Johnson's words, "been sedulous
in her efforts to prevent encroachments upon the Indian hunting
grounds, and her laws are express and pointed in invalidating entries
and grants made within such reservations."''18 The Circuit Court had
for this reason refused to admit Danforth's grant in evidence. Johnson
rejected this rigidity and pointed out that part of the grant was ad-
mittedly in land over which the Indian grant had expired; the g-rant
was therefore at least in part valid. Because of this, the case had to
be remanded so that the grant might be admitted and the case re-
considered.18 2 Johnson's decision thus refused to arbitrate between
Danforth's warrant from North Carolina and Wear's Tennessee war-
rant, but it indicated that the validity of Danforth's warrant is to
be tested by North Carolina law, thus supporting Green v. Biddle.
The Court's remand of substantially all of the issues in Danforth
contrasts with its decision in Love v. Simms' Lessee,5 3 also written
by Johnson. Plaintiff and defendant in ejectment claimed title to
certain land in Tennessee by virtue of the same North Carolina
warrant. Plaintiff's claim was based on a deed to one Allison dated
1795. The deed to defendant's predecessor was stipulated to be two
177. .The United States-Tennessce conflicts were resolved by a statute in 1806 under
which the United States surrendered its claims to Tennessee property. Id. at 347-50.
178. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 529 (1818).
179. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 673 (1824).
180. "This cause was argued at the last term, and again argued at the present term
.Id.
181. Id. at 677.
182. Id. at 680.
183. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 515 (1824).
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years older. 84 Defendant's claim would ordinarily have prevailed ex-
cept that under North Carolina law a deed did not pass an estate
unless recorded within twelve months of execution.
The resolution of Love involved a consideration of both North
Carolina and Tennessee laws. Plaintiff (holding the junior conveyance)
relied on a North Carolina law of 1788 that allowed deeds for land
in the "west" (beyond the Cumberland Mountains) to be recorded in
Hawkins County, which is in the eastern part of Tennessee, rather
than in the county in which the land was situated. Plaintiff recorded
his deed in Hawkins County in 1797. The defendant (holding the sen-
ior conveyance) did not record until 1806 and then in the county, newly
created by the State of Tennessee, where the land was situated. In his
instructions to the jury the Circuit Court Judge stated that the plaintiff
had the better title. Defendant's writ of error challenged this.185
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the Circuit Court's
instruction was error, because at the time plaintiff recorded in Hawkins
County in 1797, the special North Carolina recording law was no
longer in effect in Tennessee or North Carolina. Johnson's opinion
in this difficult case suggests a concern with the practical realities of
land ownership on the frontier. In his conclusion Johnson says: "Since
the registration in the county where the land lies, and which is the
only registration deemed valid in this cause, gave the prior registration
to the prior deed .... the Court must be adjudged to have erred in
its charge upon that subject."' 18 6 Obviously any effective system of land
registration depended on recordation in the county of situs. It is plaus-
ible that such considerations may have strongly influenced the Court,
given the tremendous confusion in Tennessee land tiles.182
184. Id. at 516.
185. At issue in the case was whether the North Carolina special recording provision
was still Tennessee law when the plaintiff, who relied on it, recorded his deed in 1797. By
its terms the Act of 1788 of North Carolina was to expire in 1790. On the other hand
Tennessee had passed a law in 1794 which established recording in Tennessee without
mentioning the special Hawkins County registration provision. In the years following and
before plaintiff's registration in Hawkins County, North Carolina had let its special pro-
vision lapse.
186. Id. at 523.
187. The Court decided another North Carolina-Tennessee land claim case in 1824,
Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532 (1824). The plaintiff had made several entries and
obtained patents. The defendant, relying on an older North Carolina grant, had brought
a number of successful ejectments, each of which was so small as to fall below the Supreme
Court's 52,000 limit on writs of error. To remedy this the plaintiff brought a bill in equity
that covered all the land and amounted to more than $2,000. The Court held that since
fraud was the gravamen of plaintiff's bill and since fraud was cognizable at law and
equity, jurisdiction attached to the first court to hear the matter. In this case the eject-
ments (at law) came first so the defendant's demurrer was sustained.
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III. The Local Law Residuum
The western land cases were but one part, albeit a significant part,
of the large mass of "local law" cases. There were in addition other
land cases not involving the western land cessions, some negotiable
instruments cases, and a few ordinary contract actions. Unlike the
western land litigation, which turned primarily on complex questions
of statutory interpretation, these cases allowed the Court to sit merely
as an appellate trier of fact or a second tier court of equity and law
conducting a trial de novo, and the Court handled them with con-
siderably greater facility.' 8 The terrain was no doubt more familiar,
and there were more legal sources189 to guide their determinations of
these traditional questions of law and equity. The issues today seem
very abstruse and the effort to understand them hardly seems jus-
tified, since for the most part these cases were decided on the basis
of arcane and now forgotten rules. However, in 1824 these decisions
may well have been among the most important that the Supreme
Court rendered, for it was the most esteemed court of equity and law
in the nation and its reports were probably more widely available than
those of any other tribunal.
Something of the flavor of these cases, now buried in a sarcophagus
of dead law is revealed by Alason v. Muncaster,190 which had been
litigated in one form or another twice in the circuit court and once
before in the Supreme Court. Mason (the complainant) had filed a
bill in equity seeking cancellation of certain promissory notes that
188. Every generalization needs a qualifier, and the case of Kirk v. Smith, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 241 (1824) qualifies the generalization that the Supreme Court handled local law
cases with particular facility. Kirk is the longest local law case of the 1824 term, occupying
84 pages. The parties were represented by the cream of the Supreme Court bar, Clay,
Webster, Sergeant, and Attorney General Wirt (representing a private party, as he did on
several other occasions during the term). Kirk dealt with a 1779 Pennsylvania Act en-
titled, "An Act for Vesting the Estates of the Late Proprietaries of Pennsylvania in this
Commonwealth." It was an act of confiscation, and the issue to be decided was the con-
fiscatory reach of the act. In an opinion by the Chief Justice running 38 pages, the Court
illustrated the problems of statutory interpretation without the benefit of any illuminating
sources. On one issue, whether the word "adverse" should be understood to modify .pos-
session even though not used, the Court in effect inserted a very significant provision
into the statute by implication, but the Court refused to modify in a similar manner the
content of another term used in the statute, "ianor land." In short, the Court's perform-
ance was inconsistency personified, and Justice Johnson in a long and vigorous dissent
quite properly objected to the Court's subjective result.
189. In Doddridge for example, there were no citations to cases or treatises, whereas
in Mason v. Muncaster, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 445 (1824). both the advocates' arguments and
the Court's opinion were replete with citations to American and English cases and trea-
tises. This comparison may be suspect in that the advocates' arguments are not uniformly
summarized in the report. Sometimes, however, when the arguments are completely
omitted, an advocate's name will be footnoted in the following manner: "He cited Foster
v. Hodgson, 19 Ves. 184. Cholmondeley v. Clinton, Jac. & Walk." Hughes v. Edwards, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824).
190. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 445 (1824).
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he had given to Muncaster and others in their capacity as church
wardens after a sale of part of the glebe"91 to Mason. Mason also
sought to have the conveyance set aside on the ground that there was
a defect in the title unknown to him at the time of purchase.
The land had been sold by a parish of the Episcopal Church, pur-
suant to the Court's decree in Terrett v. Taylor.10 2 Mason's primary
argument was that the defendants, both in this suit and in Terrett
v. Taylor, did not in fact represent the parish of Fairfax, the undis-
puted owner of the property, but rather an Episcopal congregation
of the city of Alexandria (meaning within the District of Columbia),
which was only a portion of the old parish of Fairfax. 103 Since the
true owner (the parish of Fairfax) had not been a party to the Terrett
suit, they were not bound by it. Further, because the Fairfax parish did
not participate in the conveyance, Mason's title was defective. The
defect might appear moot since the old parish no longer existed and
could no longer make any grants. However, Mason alleged that the
successors of one Jennings, who originally granted the land to the
parish, could still obtain the property in a suit against Mason as a
result of the defect. The circuit court, per Chief Justice Cranch,
resolved these matters by finding, after a careful weighing of all the
facts, that the Alexandria church was the parish of Fairfax and there-
fore the parish was bound by Terrett. 94 As to the threat of a chal-
lenge by Jennings's descendents, the court found that Mason was by
succession in privity with Jennings and the warranty in the Jennings
deed of grant provided Mason with an estoppel against Jennings's
descendents. The circuit court therefore dismissed Mason's bill.
The Court affirmed the circuit court's decision and its affirmance
is interesting evidence of the scope and nature of appellate review in
191. Glebe is "the land possessed as part of the endowment or revenue of a church or
ecclesiastical benefice." BLACK'S LAW DIMONARY 819 (1968).
192. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). In Terrett certain parishioners of the parish of
Fairfax sued the overseers of the poor of the District of Columbia and the wardens of the
parish to compel them to sell land that was wasting. The defendants (wardens and over-
seers) confessed the bill, but put in answer that the land belonged to the overseers of the
poor rather than the parish as a result of certain statutes passed by Virginia. Id. at 44. In
a powerful opinion by Justice Story the Court rejected the defendants' contention on two
grounds. First, the act which came the closest to an act of confiscation was not passed by
Virginia until after the District of Columbia, where most of the parish and the land in
question was situated, was ceded to the national government by Virginia. Second, the
Court rejected any notion of a vague escheat or confiscation of such lands on the basis of
"the principles of natural justice." Id. at 52. The Court therefore granted the prayer of
the bill and decreed that the lands might be sold if the incumbent of the parish agreed.
Id. at 54.
193. Id. at 1048. The city of Alexandria referred to was within the former Virginia
portion of the District of Columbia, but is not to be confused with present-day Alex-
andria, Virginia. The District of Columbia at that time included Alexandria county, now
also in Virginia.
194. Id. at 1050.
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1824. There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the Supreme
Court had a copy of the lower court's opinion. Nor is there anything
that suggests any deference to the lower court's determination of the
factual issues. Although the two courts reached identical factual con-
clusions, Justice Story's opinion painstakingly considers each piece
of evidence relevant to the determination of the main factual issue,
that is, whether the church in Alexandria was by itself the parish of
Fairfax.1 5
Mason also shows the facility and pleasure with which Story and
the Court dealt with matters of equity jurisprudence, as opposed to
statutory interpretation. Story confidently began the opinion with a
rap at the advocates' knuckles: "Upon the very voluminous pleadings
in this case, assuming more the shape of elaborate arguments, than
the simple and precise allegation of facts, which belong to Chancery
proceedings .. .."196 The opinion also ends on a confident note.
Story contradicted one of Mason's subsidiary claims, namely that in
Terrett all the parishioners of the parish as cestuis qui trust of the
glebe should have been joined to obtain a valid judgment against
the parish.1 7 Story correctly pointed out that they were not the bene-
ficiaries of a trust, since the property was owned by a religious cor-
poration and was to be used only for religious purposes. 198
Mason is a solid representative of the local law cases of the time.
They usually turned on technical issues of common law and equity
practice, 199 and in these minor disputes between private litigants, the
195. This is particularly striking in that the author of the lower court opinion was
William Cranch, the Supreme Court Reporter from 1801 to 1817.
196. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 445, 454 (1824).
197. Id. at 468.
198. Id. at 463. The Mason sequelae are reported in Muncaster v. Mason, 17 F. Cas.
983 (No. 9920) (D.C. Cir. 1824), and Mason v. Muncaster, 16 F. Cas. 1052 (No. 9248) (D.C.
Cir. 1828).
The tone and confidence of the opinion is of course due in part to the intellectual and
literary skills of the author, Justice Story. But this cannot be the only reason for the
Court's fluency, because Story himself was capable of writing obscure and strained
opinions. Story's opinion in a probate land case of the 1824 term, McCreery's Lessee v.
Somerville, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 354 (1824), is indicative. In McCreery's Lessee the testator
McCreery died in 1814 leaving an incorrectly witnessed will (only two rather than the
three witnesses required by Maryland law signed). Somerville claimed as devisee while
McCreery (a niece) claimed as intestate taker. The niece's claim would have been barred
by the ancient common law because she was claiming through her father (McCreery's
brother) who was an alien. The statute of 11 and 12 Win. III, ch. 6, had attempted to
change the common law. In a cryptic opinion Justice Story denied the niece the benefit
of the statute on the ground that her father (the disabling alien) was alive. Story's argu-
ment is strained, although interesting for his indication that statutes which impinge on
the common law will be interpreted narrowly.
199. Occasionally, these technical questions disguised major national controversies.
For instance the two cases involving on the surface questions of local suretyship law had
great implications for the future development of the national revenue collecting bureau-
cracy. Miller v. Stewart, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 680 (1824); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720 (1824). Until the 1824 term the United States had relied on a revenue
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Justices generally followed the teachings of the English chancellors and
common law judges.
IV. Banks
In 1824, the ongoing power struggle between states and the federal
government focused briefly on the Bank of the United States, which
had been reincorporated in 1816. In 1819 the Ohio legislature tried
to drive the Bank from the state by levying a confiscatory200 tax on
it; the tax went into effect a few months after the Supreme Court
had struck down a lesser 201 tax on the Bank in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.202 When the issue finally reached the Supreme Court five years
later as Osborn v. The Bank of the United States,20 3 Ohio was forced
to seek a direct overruling of McCulloch,204 on a set of facts which
made it appear that the state had flaunted the Court's authority. That
it would fail was a foregone conclusion.20 5
The awkwardness of Ohio's timing and the fame of McCulloch
have tended to distract attention from that state's very real grievances
against the federal Bank, and perhaps from its good faith in prose-
cuting them.20 When the Bank appeared in Cincinnati in 1817, and
a year later in Chillicothe, Ohio had just begun a legislative reform
program to control its own state-chartered banks. The national Bank
immediately ignored and violated the new statutes. The proposal to
tax the new Bank was first made in the legislature at the end of
1817, as part of continuing agitation over bank conduct in general,
and was finally enacted one month before the McCulloch decision
appeared on March 7, 1819. The tax was by no means a challenge
or an impertinence to the Supreme Court. Moreover, in 1818 and
1819 a severe recession was under way in the western states, and
Ohio state banks desperately trying to hold off bankruptcy were be-
ing outdone not only by the superior solvency of the Bank, but also
bureaucracy composed of relatively independent tax collectors who gave a performance
bond to the government at the time of taking office. This structure had been established
by "An Act for the assessment and collection of direct taxes and internal duties" passed
by Congress in 1813. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 22. Both bonds fell and the tax-
payers' money was beyond recovery because of very technical failures to comply with local
suretyship principles.
200. The tax, $50,000 on each branch of the Bank, exceeded the Bank's total dividends
for the year 1819. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 795.
201. See id. at 868.
202. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
203. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
204. See id. at 765.
205. See C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 476.
206. See Bogart, Taxation of the Second Bank of the United States by Ohio, 17 AM.
HisT. REv. 312, 323 n.51 (1912).
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by its aggressiveness as a collector of debts from those same state
banks, whose notes it held. In the preceding boom years the Bank
of the United States had behaved as irresponsibly as any; its sudden
righteousness in late 1818, though necessary to its own survival, spread
ruin and hatred through the state banking community. 20 7 Finally, by
April 1819, the Bank was in the position of owning "a large part of
Cincinnati" through foreclosures, with over six million dollars more
due and owing to it. Of its 25 state competitors, only eight were still
able to meet their obligations in specie by midsummer.20 Anti-Bank
political pressure was therefore intense, coming from farmers hurt by
falling prices as well as from the financial community. Nor was the
Ohio legislature's choice of retaliatory method unusual; at the time
the tax was enacted in February 1819, five other states already had
such taxes and the courts of two others had barred non-state banks.20
It did not, therefore, occur to the Ohio lawmakers that their tactic
might be unconstitutional. 210
When the McCulloch decision was announced, 21' the Ohio legis-
lature did not repeal the tax, and when it went into effect on Septem-
ber 1, 1819, Osborn, the state auditor, was "placed in an embarrassing
predicament." However, he decided that as a state officer his first
duty was to carry out the state laws. Before he could collect the tax
he was served with notice that the Bank would seek an injunction
against its collection; he was also served with a copy of the Bank's
petition in chancery. He ordered collection nevertheless,2 12 and the
amount of the tax-$100,000-was seized at Chillicothe, one day before
the actual injunction from the United States Circuit Court was served
on Osborn. Two months later, Chief Justice Marshall ordered Osborn
207. Bank credit in Ohio took the form of note issues, which in 1816 and 1817 had
been enormous; the state legislature discovered in January 1818 that state banks averaged
a specie reserve of only 20 percent to meet demand liabilities. When the Bank of the
United States entered the field, its own huge note issues partly displaced the state bank
notes, since the U.S. notes fluctuated less and were always convertible in coin.
The Bank of the United States discounted massive amounts of state bank paper, and it
conducted itself casually enough that in October 1818 its discounts exceeded the total
amount of banking capital in the state. Its reform of its practices began in July 1818, with
an order to its Cincinnati branch to collect 20 percent of due balances per month from
debtor state banks; then on October 30, it cut off credit to state banks altogether. See id.
at 313-18.
208. See generally id. at 313-22.
209. The five states were Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
New York, South Carolina, and Virginia were also considering the same step. Id. at 320.
210. Id.
211. The full text of McCulloch was published in Niles' Register, Mar. 20, 1819, at 68.
212. Osborn carefully sought legal advice as to whether any of the papers served on
him constituted an injunction, and was told they did not. Bogart suggests that Osborn
was not trying to defy the Court, but only insisting on technical correctness. Bogart, supra
note 206, at 325 n.60.
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and the other officials involved not to dispose of the seized money
pending decision, and they obeyed. 213
In the four and a half years between Marshall's injunction and
his final opinion, the Ohio economy improved and the Bank itself
no longer raised hackles.2 14 The state's lawyer delivered a surprisingly
poor argument, dotted with more sophistry than passion; 215 Clay rep-
resented the Bank and relied on McCulloch.21 6 Still, the various coun-
sel at argument and reargument managed to set out quite starkly the
federal-state power issue involved.
The result, in Marshall's long opinion, was a sweeping affirmation
of federal power in both-holding and dicta. Marshall saved the easiest
point-the unconstitutionality of the tax-for last, a tactic made pos-
sible by the state's order of argument, which Marshall had only to
follow. 21 7 Before reaching it, he managed greatly to enlarge federal
jurisdiction over cases under Article III of the Constitution, and he
opened the way for broad federal judicial interference with state
policies, despite the Eleventh Amendment prohibition of suits against
States in the federal courts.
Marshall's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment caused a prompt
and perhaps justifiable outcry.21 s By limiting the application of the
amendment to cases in which a state was a named party, he authorized
a range of suits against state officers, such as Osborn, acting in min-
isterial capacities. Consequently, state officers could be enjoined from
carrying out state laws by a federal court.219 Without such jurisdic-
tion, Marshall argued, state officials could obstruct federal law with
impunity:
Each member of the Union is capable, at its will, of attacking
the nation, of arresting its progress at every step . . . while the
nation stands naked, stripped of its defensive armour .... .220
With jurisdiction over state officers, of course, the federal government
could forestall the application of any state policy felt to impinge on
federal rights.
213. See generally id. at 323-24.
214. Id. at 330.
215. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 744-95. Despite the quality of the argument, Vheaton faith-
fully recorded it in full, either because of the importance of the case or because Marshall's
majority opinion follows and refutes the argument point by point. Id. at 828.
216. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 795-804.
217. See note 215 supra.
218. See C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 476.
219. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 846-59.
220. Id. at 848.
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Though it caused a smaller stir, Marshall's interpretation of Article
III aimed at an even wider expansion of federal hegemony. The Bank
had gone to federal circuit court against Osborn under the authority
of a provision of the Bank's 1816 charter which allowed it "to sue
and be sued in all State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and
in any Circuit Court of the United States"; 221 the question on which
the Court asked for reargument was the constitutionality of that pro-
vision under Article 111.222 Ohio's lawyers claimed that the case was
not one "arising under the constitution and laws of the United
States," and that the test should be whether the cause, rather than
the party, arose under federal law.223 In lordly style, Marshall ruled
that the Bank's 1816 charter alone was enough to turn every case,
even every contract, involving the Bank into one "arising under"
federal law, no matter what the dispute.
[The Bank] can acquire no right, make no contract, bring no
suit, which is not authorized by a law of the United States. It
is not only itself the mere creature of a law, but all its actions
and all its rights are dependent on the same law. Can a being,
thus constituted, have a case which does not arise literally, as well
as substantially, under the law?224
Though he dealt with the counterarguments of counsel, Marshall had
no response to the shrewder observation of Justice Johnson in dissent.
Johnson pointed out that the decision opened the way for Congress
to give federal courts jurisdiction over any kind of actions it chose;
all contracts, for example, could be made to arise under federal law
simply by passing a law requiring all contracts to be written on paper
bearing a federal stamp 2 25 The chance was small, but the power
existed.
Osborn gave Marshall an ideal case and set of arguments on which
to build new federalist doctrine, and he took full advantage, even
distorting the hapless counsel's argument for better effect.226 In con-
221. Id. at 805.
222. Id. at 804.
223. Id. at 811-14.
224. Id. at 823.
225. Id. at 874.
226. Marshall delivered some of the strongest language of his opinion against a straw
man which, according to Johnson, defense counsel never raised: Compare id. at 884 with
id. at 819-23. Nonetheless the opinion has been widely praised. Charles Warren, for one,
said that "the mighty reasoning of the Chief Justice" caused the eventual defeat of the
various anti-Supreme Court proposals then pending in state legislatures. Warren, Legisla-
tis'e and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the
Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REv. 1 (1913). See p. 772 supra.
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trast, Johnson's dissent was sober and restrained. Johnson praised the
Bank and agreed that it should be kept strong. He also divorced him-
self from the main ideological battle by a strong statement in favor
of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments.22 7 His complaint was only with the proliferation of direct
federal jurisdiction which Marshall's Article III construction would
breed. Johnson took the reasonable position that "arising under" re-
ferred to the law of the case, not the party, and that there was no
need for federal jurisdiction unless a construction of federal law was
at stake in a given case.22 8
Marshall and Johnson also split over a similar issue in Osborn's
companion case, Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of
Georgia.229 The United States Bank had sued on a Georgia bank note
which had been endorsed to it by a Georgia citizen; the case there-
fore fell outside the limits of diversity jurisdiction under § 11 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.230 Following Osborn, Marshall held that the
1816 Bank charter nonetheless permitted the Bank to sue the Georgia
bank in federal court. As Johnson accurately pointed out, Marshall
had in effect repealed the Judiciary Act's diversity provisions, at least
as to the Bank of the United States.23 1
It was in the foregoing context 232 that the Supreme Court decided
227. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 886.
228. Id. at 887-88. Johnson expressed his view as early as 1801. See State v. Pitman, 1
S.C. (1 Brevard) 32, 34 (1801).
229. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
230. Id. at 908-09.
231. Id. at 913.
232. The 1824 term also includes a number of cases which the Justices found worthy
only of short, even peremptory opinions. In importance, the underlying issues range from
trivia to life and death; in complexity, from the merest quibble about certiorari process,
Stewart v. Ingle, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 526 (1824), to the opening round of a 25-year litigation,
Walden v. Craig, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 576 (1824). Of these minor companions to the cases
discussed above, two have a certain historical piquancy.
Riggs v. Tayloe, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 483 (1824), was a simple contract action which, in
the hands of Justice Todd, required only a reiteration of the already well established
best evidence rule. What makes the opinion noteworthy is its authorship: it was one of
only 11 majority opinions Todd wrote in his 19 years on the Court, and the only majority
opinion he ever wrote on any subject other than his specialty, land law. See Israels,
Thomas Todd, in Livs OF THE JUsTICEs, supra note 3, at 408-10. Unfortunately, his
excursion into the field of evidence only proved the wisdom of his earlier reticence. His
ruling in Riggs was so inappropriate to the facts that it required Chief Justice Marshall to
unscramble matters four years later and give directions for a new trial. See Tayloe v.
Riggs, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 591 (1828).
The Court's opinion in Ex parte Burr, on the other hand, deserves attention as perhaps
ihe most delicate and judicious statement of the term, in the face of extraordinary provo-
cation. An attorney named Levi Burr, admitted to the bar of the United States Circuit
Court in the District of Columbia in 1822, had by 1823 been suspended from practice for
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Gibbons v. Ogden. The case had been pending and put off for years; 233
the decision, when it finally came, met almost unanimous acclaim.
The steamboat monopoly was thoroughly unpopular, and the Court
found itself in the unfamiliar position of being applauded by members
of all political parties for asserting federal power. The fame of the
decision was as instant as it has been enduring: 234 the news was
approvingly reported in papers across the country, and people cele-
brated with steamboat parties as far away as Georgia. 23 5
As he did in Osborn, Marshall found in Gibbons a case where his
chosen result was impossible to gainsay (in Osborn because the law
was clear, in Gibbons because the outcome was so widely desired) and
took full advantage of the chance to make extraordinary new policy
in dicta. The immediate rather than the long range consequences were
what captured public attention, even within the legal profession; still,
in a year when the Court was being harshly attacked for its federalism
and seriously threatened with the removal of its jurisdictional power
over state law, Marshall might have been expected to compromise and
lie low. Instead, he managed to deliver two of the most expansive
interpretations of federal power in the history of the Court.
If any single case forestalled the drive to repeal § 25 of the Ju-
diciary Act, it was Gibbons, which taught politicians as well as con-
stituents the virtues of federal review of state court judgments. Gib-
bons may also have dimmed the chances of the two companion pro-
literally dozens of incidents of champerty, obstructing justice, suborning perjury, and
fraud. See e.g., Ex parte Burr, 4 F. Cas. 791 (No. 2186) (1823). After admitting several of
the incidents and raising largely procedural defenses in the disbarment proceeding, Burr
had the temerity to petition the Supreme Court for mandamus to overturn his suspension.
Marshall soberly considered the law of mandamus and the conflicting interests involved,
and he met Burr's technical point on its own terms before denying the motion. 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 530-31. The opinion focuses strictly on the abstract problem of judicial
discretion in disbarment; there is no hint of the scurrilousness of Burr's behavior or the
insolence of his appeal. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
There are few conclusions to be drawn from the minor cases of 1824, but one observa-
tion is inescapable: the Chief Justice bore as disproportionate a share of the burden in
small matters as in great ones, both in mastering the law and in writing opinions. For
example, he made jurisdictional law not only on a grand scale in Osborn and Planters'
Bank, but also incrementally in six lesser cases as well. Peyton v. Robertson, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 527 (1824); Smith v. M'Iver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532 (1824); Mollan v. Torrance,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824); Walden v. Craig, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 576 (1824); M'Iver v.
Wattles, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 650 (1824); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
Whether he felt it his duty as Chief Justice or his prerogative, Marshall dominated the
Court in the range of issues he covered and the frequency with which he explained them.
233. In 1822 Justice Story wrote to a fellow Justice of his regret that Gibbons v. Ogden
would have to be decided: "We have already had our full share of the public irritations,
and have been obliged to decide constitutional questions, which have encountered much
opposition...." G. DUNNE, supra note 2, at 214.
234. Marshall's biographer called Gibbons "that opinion which has done more to knit
the American people into an indivisible Nation than any other one force in our history,
excepting only war." 4 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 429-30 (1919).
235. See generally 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 609-16.
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posals-to require a five-vote majority to declare state laws unconsti-
tutional, and to require seriatim opinions23 6-since neither would have
availed in the case. At the start of his concurrence Justice Johnson
made a statement of support for the seriatim method,2 37 but in fact his
opinion demonstrated that the existence of more than one opinion on
the majority side need not confuse the issue or dilute the holding.
Johnson's vote with the majority was also a near guarantee that there
were no hidden dissenters waiting to be flushed out by the delivery
of seriatim opinions; 238 if anyone would have dissented on this ques-
tion, he would have. Indeed there is some evidence that Marshall's
opinion, far from being a monolith, was in fact a collaboration with
Justice Story.239
A final fortuity of Gibbons was the timing of its decision. Had it
been argued in any other week from 1806-1843, a Justice with a clear
conflict of interest in the case would probably have cast a vote. Justice
Brockholst Livingston, who died in 1823, was a cousin of one of the
steamboat monopoly's founders;2 40 his successor, Justice Thompson,
was a brother-in-law of the same person.2 4 1 Ethics of the time would
not have prevented either from participating in the controversy, and
in fact Thompson had already done so with a pro-monopoly opinion
in a lower court.242 But Thompson took his seat in 1824 one week
late, and Gibbons preserved itself untainted for later, more sensitive
generations.
Based on the Supreme Court's work in 1824, it would be unjus-
tified to generalize about the law of the period, particularly where,
as here, there has been no effort to show what followed. The cases
have not even the reliable randomness of a core sample of judicial
work, since their closeness in time to one another and their collection
in one volume by an intelligent reporter undoubtedly give them an
artificial unity. If any, their virtue is that they are cases old enough
that-except perhaps for Gibbons and Osborn-practicing lawyers can
regard them without practical interest.
236. See p. 772 & note 21 supra.
237. "Mr. Justice JOHNSON. The judgment entered by the Court in this cause, has my
entire approbation; but having adopted my conclusions on views of the subject materially
different from those of my brethren, I feel it incumbent on me to exhibit those views.'
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222-23.
238. See note 21 supra.
239. See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 608.
240. Dunne, Brockholst Livingston, in LivEs OF THE JUSTICES, supra note 3, at 389.
241. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 607.
242. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507 (1812), 15 F. Cas. 697 (No. 8420) (1811).
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